University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 22
Number 2 Fall, 1991

Article 7

1991

Recent Developments: Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co.: First Amendment Does Not Prohibit an
Informant from Recovering Damages under State's
Promissory Estoppel Law for Newspaper's Breach
of Promise of Confidentiality
Jason Shapiro

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Shapiro, Jason (1991) "Recent Developments: Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: First Amendment Does Not Prohibit an Informant from
Recovering Damages under State's Promissory Estoppel Law for Newspaper's Breach of Promise of Confidentiality," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 22 : No. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol22/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

sure. Id. at 472.
Chief Judge Murphy wrote the
opinion for the court of appeals. In
deciding the first issue, the court first
gathered a working background in the
plain meaning of the term "bodily
injury" as written in the policy description. It acknowledged that without a finding of" bodily injury," coverage would not be triggered. The
court found that" [w]hile the definition of bodily injury includes sickness
and disease . . . the definition also
specifically includes injury to the body
.... " Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 475-76
(quoting Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
Forty-Eight Insulations, 451 F .Supp.
1230, 1242 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff'd,
633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980) (emphasis in original». The court also
found authority that most jurisdictions
have defined "bodily injury" to include any " localized abnormal condition." Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476. The
court also looked to Black's Law Dictionary 159 (5th ed. 1979), which
stated that "bodily injury . . .
[g]enerally refers only to injury to the
body, or to ... diseases contracted by
the injured as a result of injury." Id.
These findings illustrated that because
a distinction existed between the occurrence of " bodily injury" and the
resulting manifestation of sickness or
disease, the terminology" sickness or
disease" did not determine when an
injury took place, but only that some
injury did exist. Id. The question of
"when" was an issue for medical
experts.
Consequently, the court of appeals next looked to the affidavits of
the medical experts, Craighead and
Epstein. Id. The court noted that they
were in general agreement as to their
findings, except as to the initial incidence of "bodily injury." Id. The
court took an interest in the particular
field of each expert, just as the Supreme Court of Illinois did in Zurich
Ins. Co. v. Raymark Indus., 514
N.E.2d 150 (Ill. 1987).
The court recognized that the issue presented in Zurich was identical
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to the one presented before the court in
Mitchell. Mitchell, 595 A.2d at 476.
Nine physicians testified extensively,
and there was disagreement between
the pathologists and the clinicians as
to when an injury occurred in asbestos
cases. The clinicians conceded that
damage might occur upon inhalation,
but they also noted that the lung is
capable of repairing itself so that not
every inhalation precipitates disease.
Id. at 477 (citing Zurich, 514 N.E.2d
at 156). Without symptoms, they
argued, it would be impossible to
determine with accuracy exactly when
a disease began. Therefore, it should
follow that a disease would have to be
diagnosed by its symptoms before it
could constitute a " bodily injury." Id.
This argument, however, did not sway
the Illinois court which concluded that
once asbestos fibers are inhaled, bodily
injury occurs, and nothing within the
insurance policy requires diagnosis
nor does it require identification of
that injury within the policy period.
Simply stated, only the injury must
take place within the policy coverage,
not the subsequently-manifested disease. Id.
Extending this analysis, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that mere
exposure to asbestos without injury
does not trigger coverage. Id. at 478.
However, upon the diagnosis of a
disease, the courts will look back to
the time of initial exposure to determine when the bodily injury occurred.
Id.
In this writer's opinion, an interesting situation would have arisen if a
person had been diagnosed under the
insured's valid policy. When looking
retroactively to the point of bodily
injury, however, the initial inhalation
of asbestos predated the policy coverage. It is unclear whether coverage
would be allowed even if the insured
product clearly aggravated an otherwise pre-existing asbestos-related mild
lung condition. Technically, no injury actually" occurred" as defined by
the Maryland Casualty policy. Also,
if the process to develop lung disease

from asbestos is not immediate, it
would appear to be very difficult, if
not impossible, to decipher which
inhalation precipitated the disease, i.e.,
was it the asbestos in his own home, a
neighbors home, at work, etc. It would
seem that unless actual initial causation could be shown, coverage would
not be triggered.
The significance of Mitchell v.
Maryland Casualty Co. rests with its
possible application to other disease
related cases where exposure to a
condition is relevant, such as AIDS or
Hepatitis B in hospitals and other
facilities dealing with blood. For
now, Maryland's stance on asbestosrelated insurance coverage is to be
determined from the moment of initial
exposure, so long as a disease manifests itself as a result. This is a policy
which protects both consumers and
installers from unknown dangers which
we may not yet have the technology to
detect. It places the burden temporarily upon insurance companies who
can best afford the risk of using new
materials and devices, and in turn,
through their own influence, can pressure the manufacturers to work harder
to safeguard the public.

- Kenneth Goldsmith
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.:
FIRST AMENDMENT DOES
NOT PROIDBIT AN INFORMANT FROM RECOVERING
DAMAGES UNDER STATE'S
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL LAW
FOR NEWSPAPER'S BREACH
OF PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY.
In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991), the United
States Supreme Court held that the
First Amendment does not prohibit an
informant from recovering damages
under a state's generally applicable
promissory estoppel law for a
newspaper's breach of a promise of
confidentiality given in exchange for
information. The Court based its
decision on the theory that laws of

general applicability are not offensive
to the First Amendment merely because their enforcement has incidental
effects on a newspaper's ability to
gather and report the news. In so
ruling, the Court distinguished the
facts of this case from those in Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97 (1979), where the court held
that there could be no cause of action
against a newspaper for publishing
lawfully obtained and truthful information about a matter of public significance, absent state interest of the
highest order.
In 1982, Dan Cohen ("Cohen")
approached reporters from two newspapers owned by respondent, Cowles
Media Company. Cohen, a Republican campaign worker in Minnesota,
offered the reporters disparaging information concerning the Democratic
candidate for Lieutenant Governor in
return for a promise of confidentiality. The reporters took the information and agreed to keep Cohen's identity a secret. The two newspapers
subsequently decided to include
Cohen's name in their stories and to
identify him as the source of their
information. Cohen was fired the
same day the stories appeared.
Cohen filed suit against the newspapers in Minnesota state court, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and
breach of contract. Respondents argued that the First Amendment barred
recovery. A jury returned a verdict in
Cohen's favor and awarded him both
compensatory and punitive damages.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's award of compensatory damages, but reversed the
award of punitive damages on the
basis that Cohen had not established a
cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation. The Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed the compensatory damage award, but went on to consider
whether Cohen could recover under
promissory estoppel, a theory which
had not been advanced by either party
at trial or on appeal. The court
concluded that enforcement of the

promise of confidentiality under a
promissory estoppel theory would violate defendants' First Amendment
rights. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in order to
consider the First Amendment implications of the case.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by rejecting respondents' arguments for dismissal based on a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Court
concluded that, although the promissory estoppel theory had not been
presented by the parties in the courts
below, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had created a federal question by considering and deciding its applicability
in relation to federal law . Cohen, 111
S. Ct. at 2517 (citing Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 274-75 (1979». In addition, the Court noted that respondents
had themselves relied upon the protections of the First Amendment as a
defense in the lower courts. Cohen,
111 S. Ct. at 2517.
The Court then turned to the question of whether First Amendment protections could be triggered by a private cause of action for promissory
estoppel. Recognizing that in order to
do so, a private cause of action must
constitute "state action" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court looked to such cases
as New York TImes Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court
concl uded that" the application of state
rules oflaw in state courts in a manner
alleged to restrict First Amendment
freedoms constitutes 'state action'
under the Fourteenth Amendment."
Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517. Addressing promissory estoppel in particular,
the Court reasoned that because the
state law doctrine of promissory estoppel created obligations never explicitly assumed by the parties, it was
necessary for the courts of that state to
enforce such obligations, which constituted "state action" for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment. [d. at
2518.
The Court next considered whether
the First Amendment precluded re-

covery under a state's promissory estoppel doctrine in cases where a promiseof confidentiality had been broken.
Respondents argued that under Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97, 103 (1979), state officials
could not punish a news organization
for publication of lawfully obtained,
truthful information of public significance, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order. Cohen,
111 S. Ct. at 2518. The majority of
the Court agreed that while this proposition was "unexceptionable," Smith
was distinguishable from the case at
bar as it dealt with state-imposed limitations on what could be published,
not self-imposed limitations arising
out of an agreement. Cohen, 111 S.
Ct. at 2518-19. In addition, the Court
questioned the "lawfulness" of obtaining information by means of promises which are later broken. [d. at
2519.
The Court cited several cases which
held that generally applicable laws do
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against
the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news.
[d. at 2518. The Court expressed
"little doubt" that Minnesota's doctrine of promissory estoppel was a law
of general applicability, and that enforcement of such a law against the
press should not have been subject to
stricter scrutiny than if it were enforced against other persons or organizations within the state. [d. at 251819. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Minnesota Supreme Court was reversed,andthecasewasremandedfor
further proceedings on the issue of
whether Cohen had established a promissory estoppel claim under Minnesota law.
In one oftwo dissenting opinions,
Justice Blackmun, who was joined by
Justices Marshall and Souter, argued
that the majority was misguided in
their reliance upon cases such as AssociatedPressv. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103
(1937), and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665 (1972), because these cases
22.2/fhe Law Forum - 21

did not involve the imposition of liability based upon the content of
speech. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2520-21.
Drawing instead upon Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988),
Justice Blackmun argued that in those
cases where imposition of liability
was based upon the content of speech,
the state's interest in protecting its
citizens had been found insufficient to
remove such expressions from First
Amendment protection. Cohen, 111
S. Ct. at 2521. The Minnesota Supreme Court decision made it clear, he
concluded, that the state's interest in
enforcing its promissory estoppel doctrine was far from compelling. Id. at
2522.
Justice Souter, in a dissent joined
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
O'Connor, argued that the case did
not fall within the lineof cases cited by
the majority which held the press to
laws of general applicability. Id. He
instead suggested compliance with the
Court's methodology in earlier cases
such as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988), where it was
found necessary to " articulate, measure, and compare the competing interests involved in any given case to
determine the legitimacy of burdening
constitutional interests .... " Cohen,
111 S. Ct. at 2522. According to
Justice Souter, the public interest in
being better informed and thus more
prudently self-governed was paramount to the state's interest in enforcing a newspaper's promise of confidentiality. He admitted, however,
that were Cohen's identity of less
public concern, liability might not be
constitutionally prohibited. Id. at
2523.
The Supreme Court's holding in
Cohen will undoubtedly affect how
reporters deal with their informants.
Newspapers now have legal incentives to not disclose the identity of a
confidential source, even when that
person's identity is itself newsworthy.
More importantly, this decision demonstrates the Court's reluctance to
expand the boundaries of the news
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media's First Amendment privileges.

- Jason Shapiro
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert:

COURTROOM CWSURE
PRESUMPTIVELY VIOLATIVE
OF FIRST AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS ABSENT SPECIFIC FINDINGS SHOWING
PREJUDICE TOWARDS
DEFENDANT.
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Colbert,
593 A.2d 224 (Md. 1991), the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that the
public and media cannot be excluded
from a preliminary criminal hearing
without first being provided with an
opportunity to argue against such closure. The court further held that all
findings of fact supporting the courtroom closure and the sealing of the
transcript must be made on the record.
Tyrone Michael Colbert was indicted for first degree murder and
other related criminal charges. The
State notified the defendant of its
intention to seek the death penalty or
alternatively, life without parole. Prior
to trial, Colbert filed a motion to
enforce a prior plea bargain agreement with the State.
At the hearing on the motion,
Colbert requested that the hearing be
closed to the public. The State objected to the closure because of the
public's right to know about the subject matter. Nevertheless, the trial
court held that the defendant's rights
to a fair trial outweighed the public's
right to be present at the hearing. A
reporter for the Baltimore Sun Company ("Sun") also objected to the
closure. The Sun reporter argued the
paper had a constitutional and common law right to attend the hearings.
The court stated that it would re-open
the hearing when counsel for the Sun
arrived. The court then ordered exclusion of everyone from the hearing,
except for the parties and counsel.
Counsel for the Sun was unable to
gain immediate access to the hearing,
but when counsel was allowed into the

courtroom, the judge refused to reopen the hearing. Counsel for the Sun
then requested that the nature of the
hearing be disclosed and the records
of the proceedings be provided. When
counsel's requests were denied, the
Sun appealed the ruling, arguing that
it had a constitutional and common
law right to attend pretrial hearings
and to examine pleadings. Id. at 227.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari prior to consideration by the court of special appeals to
determine two questions.
.
The court first addressed the issue
of whether prior notice of a courtroom
closure during a pretrial proceed ing in
a criminal case is required and whether
an opportunity to oppose such closure
is required. Second, the court determined whether the lower court violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights in its hearing
and sealing of the closure motion. Id.
at 226.
The court began its analysis by
stating that there is a general presumption of openness in criminal trial proceedings as guaranteed by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 227
(citing Richmond Newspapers Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,573 (1980)).
In concluding that the trial court erred
in the present case, the court of appeals relied on a two-prong test developed in Press-Enterprise Co. v. SuperiorCourt, 478U.S.1 (1986). Colbert,
593 A.2d at 228. The court stated the
test as first, "whether the place and
process have historically been open to
the press and general public[,J" and
second, " whether public access plays
a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question." Id. (quoting Press Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 8). Applying Press
Enterprise, the court recognized that
if the two-prong test is satisfied, there
is a qualified right of access to a
judicial pretrial proceeding, based on
the First and Fourteenth Amendments

